One of the most talked-about topics in philosophy that I've observed in many circles has been that of suffering. Either directly via questions such as "Why does God allow us to suffer", or indirectly about whether suffering prevents one from living a good life. Given that the topic occupies such a large part of contemporary discourse, it appears apt to choose it for analysis both by itself and for its implications on Deism.
Suffering can be defined as undergoing or feeling pain. There are many forms and types of suffering that differ in their specificities, but all of them will qualify via the aforementioned definition. Suffering has a negative connotation and is defined with a negative valence. Most people do not endeavor to suffer for the sake of suffering. Suffering is usually encountered through specific life events that are undesired or unwanted. It is generally preferable not to suffer than otherwise.
Intuitively, it makes sense to accept that something with a negative connotation is intrinsically bad. However, as I would like to argue, doing so is a mistake and one I witness countless times. Notwithstanding a larger debate about utilitarianism, there is no good reason to axiomatically accept suffering as bad or evil. Suffering often coincides with or follows after evil, but does not possess an identity relationship with it. There may be some “good” times to suffer if suffering and pleasure do not constitute an evil/good dichotomy.
There are some obvious examples of when causing suffering is evil. Deliberately injuring someone or causing their demise is morally evil, but for the reason that their property (body) is invaded and harmed unduly. If suffering were the only qualification for why such an act would be immoral, self-defense would cease to be moral, as the attacker would undoubtedly face suffering from being attacked back. Furthermore, we also know of actions that do not cause suffering but are immoral. If one were to steal $100 from me and if I were not to notice it, I would not suffer, but the act of stealing would be immoral due to a contradiction in the rational will of the robber.
The stronger counterpoint to the claim that suffering is intrinsically evil is that it often accompanies actions that are themselves morally justified or rationally necessary. Many moral lessons are learned through suffering. Lying leads to social ostracization and suffering, which, if learned from, leads one to become a better person by ceasing to lie. As does any negative moral act for the most part. We also often inflict suffering on ourselves at times, either through physical exercise or through mental exercise in the pursuit of some greater goal. Either to become physically fitter or to resolve dilemmas in our thoughts and formulate better ideas. We see instances of suffering preceding or coinciding with positive changes, which negates this argument in favor of suffering being intrinsically evil. If the argument were to be accepted, suffering would be both intrinsically evil and intrinsically good, which is impossible.
I anticipate some objections about the above paragraph, only proving that suffering is permissible when counterbalanced with a greater "good" feeling. My argument against that would be that it is entirely permissible to cause suffering sometimes that will obviously not be counterbalanced later on. Defending against an intruder by possibly fatal means is one such case. Suppose a thief comes up to you and demands five dollars. Upon saying no, you are attacked and defend yourself. The thief is severely hurt and is left with permanent injuries. Would you be immoral for defending yourself against theft, even if it caused more suffering than merely losing $5? It seems absurd to suggest so, and if this is the case then suffering cannot be evil by itself. There must be determinants of good and evil that are not merely pain and pleasure.
Once this distinction between suffering and evil is clarified, its implications for arguments about God, especially within Deism, become apparent. It severely limits the rhetorical ability of questions such as "Why does God allow us to suffer?". It is a fundamentally different question from "Why does God cause us harm?" or "Why does God act with malice?" While it is possible to point to conceptions of God(s) in religions and point to immoral acts, this does not happen within Deism because no specific acts are claimed beyond creation. Our primary issue with religions ought to be that they suggest God(s) partake in acts considered evil if considered by mankind, and not merely that they open up the possibility of suffering. Conflating evil and suffering is common, as many formulations of the problem of evil are really just problems of suffering. Avoiding and correcting this conflation is necessary for the construction of proper arguments and worldviews.