The problem of evil is one of the most well-known objections to the existence of God. It has been instrumental to refuting some Theist arguments, but does it also refute Deism? In this article, we look at why that is not the case.
There are two types of the problem of evil. The logical problem of evil states that if God is perfect, then evil should not exist as a perfect God would have the ability to create a world without evil. Conversely, evidential problem of evil states that evil can coexist with God, but lowers it's probability for existence. Since the latter uses a form of inductive reasoning, it does not come to an absolute conclusion. Due to this, I will focus on the logical problem of evil but I am convinced the argument below is a refutation of both.
The logical problem of evil can be expressed in the following propositional format:
- Premise 1: God exists.
- Premise 2: God is perfect. (Omnipotent, Omniscient, Omnibenevolent)
- Premise 3: A perfect being can prevent evil.
- Premise 4: Evil exists in our world.
- Conclusion: The existence of evil in our world disproves a perfect being (God).
This may seem logically valid, but it eventually devolves into the "problem of suffering" rather than the problem of evil. The former does not come to the proof that the latter claims to show. I should note that I borrow heavily from Alvin Plantinga's work, and I heavily recommend reading him as a source on the matter.
Unless you are a utilitarian, evil is not defined solely in natural terms. There exists a distinction between metaphysical evil and natural evil that is the key to understanding why the aforementioned argument isn't a refutation. Metaphysical evil refers to immoral actions committed by rational or moral actors. An example of this is a human choosing to rob another human. By contrast, natural evil refers to non-moral suffering. Natural disasters are an example of natural evil. A tornado causes suffering, but it is not metaphysically evil as a tornado is not a moral entity.
From a Deist perspective, natural evils are immaterial because we do not see God as immanent (ever-present) in our universe. These natural evils are caused by physical factors or laws and do not constitute metaphysical evil. As such, they cannot be attributed to a moral being like God. One could argue that God could've made a world without natural evils, but this presumes that a perfect world exists which could've existed instead of ours. However, trying to arrive at a perfect world is much like trying to arrive at a perfect number. Take a hypothetical perfect world and add one more good being inside it, and now you have a better more-perfect world. Unless one can assign moral culpability for these natural evils to God, the objection fails. This is where I believe the evidential argument against God fails.
We haven't yet addressed metaphysical evil which has the characteristic of always being traced back to a moral entity. Metaphysical evil only exists because choice exists. As such, it only exists because free will does. If beings do not act with free will, they do not inherit moral culpability for their actions. We know metaphysical evil exists in our world because humans sometimes do bad things, so why doesn't it refute God? Since metaphysical evil derives from free will, we know that moral culpability only applies to the moral actor who committed the immoral act. Since God isn't immanent in our universe, we do not view God as "willing" this evil. It is true that God creates the possibility of metaphysical evil by creating moral actors but this does not constitute "willing" evil, as it is theoretically possible for all moral actors to act morally. That they don't is because they choose otherwise.
I will concede that God could theoretically create a world without metaphysical evil, but this would necessarily have to be a world without free-will and morality. Without morality, "evil" itself ceases to be a meaningful concept. Should God have necessarily made a world without morality? No, because willing the possibility of evil is not the same as causing it. I doubt anyone would assign me moral culpability for making a stick which could be used by another person to harm others. Therefore, the logical problem of evil does not demonstrate the incompatibility of evil and God.